On July 11, 2026, Federal Minister for National Food Security Rana Tanveer Hussain chaired the ninth meeting of the Wheat Board, where officials concluded that Pakistan had achieved its wheat production target and held sufficient stocks.

The official statement also reported unanimous agreement among provincial representatives that the country had enough wheat, with no shortages anywhere.

Yet roughly two weeks later, another high-level Wheat Board meeting reached a different conclusion. Provincial demand had exceeded available stocks, officials said, and the government was exploring the import of 1 million tons of wheat.

Either the original estimates were wrong, or the country’s wheat supply picture changed dramatically within a matter of weeks. Neither possibility inspires confidence in the systems used to manage one of Pakistan’s most important crops.

As farmers prepare to sow the next wheat crop, the questions are unavoidable. Why does one of the world’s largest wheat producers repeatedly find itself considering imports? And how long will farmers continue to bear the cost of poor planning?

Why Does Pakistan Keep Importing Wheat?

There is no clear answer because the government’s production estimates vary significantly depending on the source.

Pakistan has imported wheat repeatedly since 2019, but the gaps between available estimates raise questions about whether import decisions are based on a reliable assessment of domestic production, consumption and reserves.

The government draws on several sources, including provincial Crop Reporting Services, SUPARCO, the Land Information and Management System, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. However, provincial Crop Reporting Services data remain central to national planning.

For the 2025-26 crop, the Federal Committee on Agriculture initially set a production target of 29.68 million tons from 9.65 million hectares. The Pakistan Economic Survey estimated production at 29.61 million tons from 9.48 million hectares, suggesting that the target had been achieved or nearly met.

SUPARCO’s satellite-based assessment, however, put production at 27.48 million tons from 8.84 million hectares. That is around 2.13 million tons below the Economic Survey estimate, with approximately 640,000 fewer hectares under cultivation.

Although SUPARCO’s estimates have not been fully validated through field assessments, the difference is too large to ignore. A gap of more than 2 million tons can materially change decisions about imports, reserves and domestic availability.

Khalid Saeed Wattoo, an agriculture development professional, told ProPakistani that the Crop Reporting Service’s area-frame sampling method had become less reliable as farm sizes shrank and agricultural practices changed, particularly in the use of inputs and mechanization.

The problem is not limited to supply estimates. Demand calculations also need closer scrutiny.

A publicly reported government assessment estimated wheat requirements through April 2027 at 34.33 million tons. This included 30.83 million tons for human consumption, 1.5 million tons for feed and seed, and 2 million tons for strategic reserves.

The human consumption estimate was based on a population of 268 million and annual per capita wheat consumption of 115 kilograms, covering both commercial and household consumption.

However, the latest Household Integrated Economic Survey recorded a 5.57 percent decline in annual per capita wheat consumption in rural and urban households. Consumption fell from 84 kilograms in 2018-19 to 79 kilograms in 2024-25.

Household figures do not capture commercial and industrial consumption, so they cannot independently establish total national demand. Still, the decline raises questions about why the government continues to use the same 115-kilogram benchmark without adequately explaining whether its assumptions remain valid.

Years of Failed Wheat Policies

The roots of the current uncertainty can be traced to the 2023-24 wheat scandal, involving imports of 3.59 million tons under the caretaker government.

A special study by the Auditor General of Pakistan identified unreliable stock and demand data and delays in public procurement that favored the private sector as major issues in the episode.

The imports left the market with excessive supplies, followed by a domestic harvest that exceeded expectations. Punjab subsequently scaled back large-scale procurement in 2024 instead of purchasing wheat at the announced rate of Rs. 3,900 per maund.

Farmers were left selling their crops for around Rs. 3,000 per maund or less, suffering substantial losses as a result.

The political fallout was considerable. Inquiry committees were formed and officials were moved, but the underlying questions about procurement decisions, forecasting and accountability remained unresolved.

The episode also became an argument for reducing government intervention in the wheat market. Public procurement had accumulated a circular debt-like burden exceeding Rs. 680 billion, creating a strong case for reform.

But withdrawing from the market without first fixing the weaknesses that contributed to the previous crisis created another set of problems.

Last year, the government introduced Electronic Warehouse Receipts, allowing farmers to store wheat in approved warehouses for four months and use the receipts to obtain bank financing. The system was intended to help farmers meet immediate cash needs without selling their crops at depressed harvest-time prices.

In principle, this offered a way to reduce pressure on farmers while limiting the government’s direct role in procurement. In practice, the scheme was introduced too late and lacked sufficient infrastructure.

The government’s free-market approach also coincided with reported police action against private wheat stocks and restrictions on crop movement. Reports of action against farmers storing their own wheat added to uncertainty in a sector that was supposed to operate with greater market freedom.

Such unpredictability can discourage private investment and make the transition to a less interventionist market more difficult.

Punjab attempted another approach this year, aiming to build strategic reserves of around 3 million tons through indirect procurement. Eleven companies were selected, with the government offering bank-financing assistance, a 70 percent subsidy on financing mark-up, access to Food Department storage facilities and government personnel.

The initiative failed to gain the expected traction as financing negotiations between banks and most selected companies encountered difficulties.

Meanwhile, changes in harvesting patterns and climate conditions have complicated market management. Mechanization has shortened harvesting periods, bringing large volumes of wheat to market simultaneously and pushing prices down.

But a temporary surge in arrivals does not necessarily mean the country has produced more wheat overall. Market sources reported lower yields in several districts than a year earlier. As concerns about supply emerged, prices increased across Punjab.

This exposed another weakness in the procurement framework. The government expected participating companies to buy wheat at a benchmark price of Rs. 3,500 per maund, but the financing and pricing arrangements left questions about whether buying wheat remained commercially attractive when market prices moved above or below that level.

Is It Easier to Ignore Farmers?

The political incentives behind wheat policy also deserve attention.

The 2022 Economic Survey described wheat as a strategic crop and warned that production shortfalls could create political uncertainty. That concern helps explain why successive governments have often preferred to secure additional supplies rather than risk shortages and soaring flour prices.

For a country that depends on external financing and regularly negotiates with the IMF, sudden food price increases can create economic and political pressure. Importing wheat may appear to offer insurance against that risk, even when the decision contributes to excess supplies and lower prices for local farmers.

But this approach can shift the cost of policy mistakes onto agricultural producers.

Urban consumers feel the effects of shortages and expensive flour immediately. Farmers, by contrast, may suffer when procurement is reduced, prices collapse at harvest time or the government changes its rules after they have already invested in a crop.

That imbalance raises a difficult question: have governments become more concerned about avoiding visible food shortages than about ensuring predictable returns for farmers?

Political parties may be able to recover rural support through established local networks and electoral relationships. Farmers who bear losses from changing policies, however, cannot easily recover the money spent on seed, fertilizer, fuel, machinery and land preparation.

This does not mean imports are always wrong or public procurement should never be reduced. It means the government needs reliable data and a consistent policy before asking farmers to bear the consequences of a change in direction.

What Needs to Change?

Pakistan needs a credible wheat forecasting system that combines provincial crop surveys, satellite imagery, field verification and other available data. Major differences between estimates should be investigated before decisions are made on imports and reserves.

The government should also publish quarterly wheat balance sheets showing production, available stocks, consumption, imports and expected requirements. Demand estimates need to be updated using household surveys and commercial consumption trends rather than relying indefinitely on a fixed per capita benchmark.

Affordable crop insurance could help distribute the risks of climate-related losses and sharp price declines between farmers, insurers and the government. The Electronic Warehouse Receipt system also needs better financing arrangements, wider warehouse coverage and timely implementation so farmers can borrow against stored crops instead of selling at unfavorable prices.

Some of these measures are already being pursued. The bigger issue is sequencing: the systems needed to make the transition work should have been established before the government abruptly changed its approach to procurement.

Pakistan cannot build a stable wheat market by repeatedly switching between imports, public procurement and deregulation without reliable estimates of production and demand.

Until those weaknesses are addressed, farmers risk paying for the same mistakes again, while the country continues to question whether it has enough wheat.